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The author identifies selected implicit or not fully explicit assumptions made by Noam 
Chomsky in his theory of language. Through careful lecture of Chomsky's work, she aims to 
expose the solutions this linguist proposes with respect to two fundamental questions: the 
question of methodology and the question of the ontological status of language. This paper 
consists of two main parts. In the first one, the author reviews the most central postulates of 
Chomsky’s methodology and the basic theses regarding language that can be found in his 
works. In the second part, she turns to the problem question that is mentioned in the title of 






The methodological assumptions as well as preliminary answers that were introduced by 
Noam Chomsky as he was laying the foundations for 20c linguistics have long been 
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considered a classic element of the reflection on the basic problems in the philosophy of 
language. In particular, whenever the questions of language acquisition, language innateness 
or methods of the study of language are raised, his theories are customarily quoted either as a 
starting point for further discussion or, at least, as a reference point for the author’s own 
views. Nevertheless, the classic status of Chomsky’s texts is no help in their lecture. 
Numerous comments, both by his supporters and opponents, together with the evolution of his 
standpoint make the tasks of clarifying the basic notions and sorting out its theses all the more 
difficult. Chomsky’s works and the problems addressed therein have been of significant 
importance from the point of view of the philosophy of language, and the philosophical 
efforts for putting Chomsky’s linguistic conception in order derive from the enormous interest 
generated by these works and problems. Consequently, a critical examination of his approach 
is a result of the desire to understand his conception that is fundamental for further study of 
natural language. Thus, it appears all the more important to pin down those of Chomsky’s 
assumptions regarding language that seem to be either incompatible with the larger body of 
his theory or not fully sound. 
 The task that I have set myself in this paper is as follows: I would like to identify 
selected implicit or not fully explicit assumptions that are made by Chomsky, as well as 
isolate the basic notions connected with language and look into the consequences of their use 
in different contexts. This pertains to the philosophical assumptions, which I take to include 
the theses related to the terms that are deeply entrenched in the philosophical tradition, but 
also the theses that concern well-known philosophical problems. My aim, as a philosopher 
interested in the problems of the philosophy of language, is to identify in Chomsky’s theory 
coherent solutions to two fundamental questions: the question of methodology (which 
includes the author’s awareness of his assumptions, as well as setting forth his theoretical 





language, as an object of one’s study, actually is has vital consequences not only with respect 
to the clarity of the theses put forward within the framework of one’s own theory, but also 
with respect to the possibilities for arguing about specific aspects of the properties of 
language; and such controversies can be cognitively productive only on condition that the 
parties are agreed on some basic description of language
1
. In other words, it is important to 
ask whether the questions that a given controversy generates can be fitted into a common 
cognitive structure, since only then will the disputing parties respect each other’s arguments. 
 I would like to emphasize that the objective behind the analyses conducted in this 
paper is more than just to report. My goal is to place Chomsky’s theory on the axis of the 
controversies regarding language acquisition. In my opinion, the lack of agreement on the 
basic issues of ontology and methodology, observable in debates in a variety of research 
areas, stems largely from the parties’ entering the discussion with certain implicit 
metaphysical assumptions already taken for granted. By “metaphysical assumptions” I mean 
such theses that are accepted on the strength of an arbitrary decision (mostly resulting from 
the person’s more general philosophical outlook) as clear and self-evident, and that concern 
the most fundamental phenomena in a given theory. Frequently, they are treated as statements 
that have to be accepted by the opponents of the theory as well. Such assumptions are 
necessarily found in all theories (as there is no theory without assumptions); however, the 
more of them are made explicit by the researcher, the more mature the theory is. It must be 
emphasized here that the fact that certain philosophical assumptions are implicit need not 
mean they should be rejected. Still, making them explicit makes it possible to reveal the 
actual cognitive means and ends that inhere in the complex formulas of every conception that 
attempts to describe the phenomenon of natural language. It also makes it possible to 
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 Chomsky is well known as an ardent polemicist and a critic of opposing theories. Suffice it to mention here his 
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demonstrate the relativity of the theory in regard to its presupposed theses. This concerns in 
particular those theories that proclaim neutrality and objectivity, understood as a “purely 
empirical” or “purely rationalist” starting point, where the notions of rationality and 
“empiricality” are taken to be absolutely unequivocal. I will not answer here the question of 
whether tracking down implicit metaphysical assumptions or inconsistencies in the use of 
basic notions disqualifies Chomsky’s theory or merely casts doubt on its peripheral 
statements. 
 One could ask whether considering the problems dealt with in this paper is 
substantiated, given that over the years, Chomsky has modified its theory, reformulated some 
of its premises, and introduced new theses. As a result, it seems that the doubts presented here 
do not apply to the same degree to Chomsky’s views from different periods of his intellectual 
activity. What is more, one could successfully argue for a distinction into “early Chomsky” 
and “later Chomsky”. Thus, his position as presented in Syntactic Structures (1957) is purely 
linguistic, devoid of any overt philosophical statements. It is only later, during the 
development of his Standard Theory, that Chomsky becomes an advocate of clearly 
expounded philosophical views (including nativism, with which he is typically associated). It 
must be added that his recent theory is related to the minimalist program and its distinct 
connections with cognitive science (Chomsky 1995). When speaking of  the evolution of 
Chomsky’s views what one usually has in mind is the particular conclusions and they way in 
which they are presented. In an analysis of his ideas on the level of assumptions or theses of a 
philosophical nature (explicit – in his later works, or implicit – in the early works) it is easy to 
notice that the bulk of his core beliefs have remained unchanged, an observation that finds 
confirmation in numerous interviews (Stone, Davies 2002: 276). It is those core beliefs that 






Chomsky’s Methodology: What and How we Study When We Study Language?  
 
If one undertook to summarize Chomsky’s methodological postulates by means of a 
list of headwords, this would yield the following sequence of “isms”: realism – naturalism (of 
a biological sort) – rationalism (nativism) – empiricism (as a starting point for the method of 
study) – cognitive psychology (as the proper domain of linguistic study). The following list of 
entries does not, in and of itself, have an explanatory function and requires supplementation 
with further comments, but it allows one to illustrate the complexity of the theory with respect 
to the philosophical dimension of the quoted concepts and theories laden with historical 
tradition. This complexity is the main reason why a number of terms used by Chomsky can be 
difficult to understand. Since Chomsky himself takes these terms to be unambiguous, no 
further explanation of them is offered in his texts. This topic will be discussed in more detail 
further in the text.  
 The objectives of the theoretical activity of a linguist or a philosopher can be derived 
from the above headwords. Namely, the goal of the analyses undertaken by a researcher of 
language is the description of language forms that are hidden on a deeper level – the basic, 
universal structure of language. One needs to abstract the principal rules lying at the 
foundation of specific rules in particular languages – the focus put mostly on syntactic rules – 
and show how those rules are inherent in, and can be applied to, the genetic makeup of the 
child (Chomsky 2002: 93). Chomsky’s biologically-minded rationalism results in specific 
consequences to the treatment of the philosophical study of language. First of all, capturing 
the essence of the functioning of language consists in explicating its structure and the ways of 
generating expressions (understood here as portions of information), not in investigating the 
sources of the meaning the expressions are endowed with. Thus, semantics, understood 





signs to what they represent, is beside the scope of this account. What is more, the sacred 
traditional assumptions regarding the ways of describing language need to be discarded. The 
belief about the holistic character of natural language, the ascription of explanatory and 
constitutive functions to the rules, and the emphasis on the conventionality of language and 
the theoretical role of public language – can all serve as examples. 
To Chomsky, language is a unique biological capacity which he calls the language 
organ, or the faculty of language, FL (Chomsky 2000a: 85). In his later work, he 
distinguishes between the faculty of language in the broad sense, FLB, and the faculty of 
language in the narrow sense, FLN. The former is comprised of the inner computational core 
connected to two internal systems: the sensorimotor system and the conceptual-intentional 
system; the latter is the computational core itself, independent from the other systems to 
which it is linked or with which it interacts (Chomsky, Hauser, Fitch 2002: 1570). Humans 
posses this unique capacity as a result of their particular evolutionary history as a species, and 
thanks to a particular configuration of the genes. Particular natural languages (Polish, English, 
etc.) that linguists investigate, are the states of FL (Chomsky 2000a: 86-87). To put it 
differently, the language faculty is a distinct state of the mind/brain, whose initial state is 
common to the entire species. In its narrow sense (FLN), this faculty constitutes a 
characteristic and unique system specific to the human species.  
 The possession of the faculty of language has to be manifested. That is, a basic 
requirement that language as understood by Chomsky must meet, is that individual speakers 
be able to use it (Chomsky 2002: 118). For language to be possible to use, its expressions 
(whose number is taken to be infinite) have to be implementable in the biological cognitive 
system of humans. Language use is possible, to the same degree, thanks to the appropriately 
pre-programmed human sensorimotor system and to the conceptual organization in the mind 





any other, “external”, requirement or criteria, such as being representational, referring to the 
world, having an informational function or subserving communication, to name just a few 
(Chomsky 2002: 108). It can be studied only with respect to its adaptation to the biological or 
computational systems in which it is implanted as a biological organ. 
 The language that constitutes the proper object of linguistic study is internalized 
language (I-language), distinguished by Chomsky from socially shareable, public “external” 
language used within a given community (E-language). The former is individual, internal, 
intensional language specific to each individual person, constituting a part of their mental 
endowment; it is comprised of computational procedures and a lexicon. The latter is simply 
an idealized object, commonly called Polish, English, Chinese, etc., that has no ontological 
status of its own (is just a characteristic epiphenomenon). Grammar in this context is a 
linguistic theory which object is I-language. (Smith 2004) 
 The task of the researcher of language is to establish the zero state of the language 
faculty and determine the conditions under which the transition to the full development can 
take place. From this perspective, language is a system of generative grammar, that is, a 
recursive system in which the rules for creating expressions are specified and definite.
2
 It 
comprises: a set of basic rules of a limited character, a set of transformations mapping the 
deep structures, formed according to the basic rules, on the surface structures, and a set of 
phonological rules. To put it differently, a generative grammar is a formalized system of rules 
which base on the lexicon to generate the sentences of a given language and assign to each of 
them a structural analysis.
3
 The universal grammar is “the system of principles, conditions, 
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 According to generative grammar, language consists of two kinds of structures: deep and surface, connected 
with each other in a particular way. Surface structures are formed from deep structures, mostly abstract, by the 
use of certain type of transformations (Chomsky 1968: 5). Because of numerous misinterpretations, Chomsky 
has abandoned the distinction into deep and surface structures in his later work. 
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 It should be observed at this point that Chomsky’s theory has undergone an evolution: the Standard Theory 





and rules that are elements or properties of all human languages not merely by accident but by 
[biological] necessity” (Chomsky 1975: 29). It is part of the human genotype, universal for all 
humans. 
 
The Doubts Regarding Selected Assumptions on Language Made in Chomsky’s Theory  
 
 Chomsky, following the scientific tradition of making the terms used maximally exact, 
criticizes the opacity of the philosophical use of such notions as “metaphysical”, “language”, 
“common language”, “public language” – to name only a few. In addition to this, he claims 
that because of their specificity (inhering in a speculative context with no reference to 
empirical facts) it is impossible to use them with the proper exactness (Chomsky 1968: 411). 
Therefore, their application within a theory is illegitimate, given that their ontological status 
remains undefined and their use is obscure, unclear, and undetermined (Chomsky 2000a: 77-
78, Kasher 1991: 10). At this point, it is worth noting that there is no clarity nor full 
consistency in the way in which Chomsky himself understands the notions to which he refers 
in his theory. This concerns, in particular, such notions as “thought”, “empirical” (as opposed 
to “theoretical”), “empirical study”, “fact”, “abstract”. I do not propose that each of the 
notions that finds application within a theory should be defined and made painstakingly exact; 
what is more, I doubt whether this could be achieved. Still, in the context of methodological 
assumptions made by Chomsky and his appeals for the precise (“scientific”, as he calls it) use 
of notions, it is prudent to examine whether the recommendations he issues for other theories 
are observed with respect to terms he himself uses. I will now take a closer look at some of 
such notions, as well as the assumptions that are founded on them. To this end, I will make 
use of several examples. 
                                                                                                                                                        
Standard Theory, later to become Government and Binding Theory. I will not address here any of the nuances 






Example One: Empiricality 
 
As has been already observed, Chomsky advocates a strict adherence to the facts according to 
the methodology of the natural sciences (Chomsky 1968: 25). While it is stressed that 
naturalistic methodology does not have a privileged status, still it is considered to be the most 
adequate tool for studying language (Chomsky 2000a: 77). This consists, roughly, in the 
analysis of an empirically accessible phenomenon, which is given in the form of the 
knowledge of language possessed by children. This phenomenon, in the theory discussed 
here, has been well defined, and idealized to a sufficient degree
4
. Chomsky also claims that 
the problem of the acquisition of the foundations of the knowledge of language is an open 
empirical question, that is it cannot and should not be decided by means of a priori 
argumentation or pure conceptual analysis. In his famous critic of Skinner’s view he writes: “I 
have intended this review not specifically as a criticism of Skinner’s speculations regarding 
language, but rather as a more general critique of behaviorist (I would now prefer to say 
“empiricist”) speculation as to the higher mental processes. (...) The conclusion that I hoped 
to establish in the review (...) was that the general point of view is largely mythology and that 
its widespread acceptance is not the result of empirical support (my underline – A.D.), 
persuasive reasoning or the absence of a plausible alternative.” (Chomsky 1967: 142). Hence, 
linguists and biologists (in the important domains of psychology and anthropology) should 
abandon counterproductive theoretical debate and concentrate on more collective efforts 
focused on the analysis of particular component parts of the language faculty (Chomsky, 
Hauser, Fitch, 2002: 1578). At the same time, Chomsky advocates specific theoretical 
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analyses in his opposition to behaviorism and traditional empiricism. Chomsky is a well 
known critic of Quine, who – according to Chomsky, utterly mistakenly – champions a 
systematic rejection of the study of mental structures. In his numerous works he postulates 
that linguists should not rely strictly on behavioral evidence and criteria. According to the 
rationalistic standpoint he subscribes to, whatever it is that meets the standards of rational 
thinking can benefit theoretical linguistics. Empiricism with behavioral equipment has to be 
rejected also for political reasons, since it pretend its techniques to be neutral in reference to 
the oppression and control (Chomsky 1988: 244). 
Here, one faces the obvious problem of deciding what counts as “good” as opposed to 
“bad” empirical evidence. What is worthwhile empirical research and how to conduct it, and 
when does advocating its necessity result merely from earlier presuppositions stemming from 
too rash empirical methodology? How to distinguish theorizing that is mere speculation 
devoid of any cognitive benefit from theorizing that is based on reasoning akin to that used in 
logical and mathematical procedures? One could ask whether the knowledge of language can 
be studied at all without making numerous prior assumptions regarding its nature and ways of 
its manifestation? Chomsky’s approach appears to be rather unclear. In a considerable number 
of his texts, Chomsky expresses a belief that theoretical linguistics functions, and should 
function, on a high level of abstraction, so that its psychological reality should not be subject 
to evaluation (Chomsky 1957). At the same time, he decides the validity of all of the 
questions that are posed in theories of language on the basis of their empirical reality, 
factuality that must be assumed to be confirmable on some neutral grounds. He clearly rejects 
something he calls empiricism, but not empirical methods as such, which initially can produce 
a difficult task of separating one from another (McGilvray 1999: 32-33). Chomsky appears to 
be a covert proponent of the view that there exists the one and only paradigm of empirical 





(regardless of the given theory’s objectives, scope of concepts, and accepted assumptions) 
what an indubitable empirical verification consists in; to put it simply, it could decide what 
may or may not count as empirical evidence for some thesis (Clark 2003: 18). From the 
perspective of the debates that take place in contemporary philosophy of science, or the 
descriptions quoted by the historians of science, such a standpoint is both naïve and 
unfounded. In particular, one cannot ignore the fact that numerous experiments conducted in 
the many disciplines that study the origin and development of the faculty of language, e.g. by 
scrutinizing the mental processes of infants, require interpretation, and their results are very 
far from unequivocal (Hitchcock
 
2004, Pickering 1992, Haith 1998). 
The notions of the empirical and related categories are connected with yet another 
notion important for Chomsky’s theory; I would like to address it with a short comment. What 
I mean here is the category of explanation, which Chomsky treats with considerable 
optimism. In Language and Mind, Chomsky holds that it is possible to provide an exhaustive 
physicalist explanation for the totality of the mental phenomena, since such explanations 
become available for an ever-increasing number of phenomena previously considered as 
inexplicable within a physicalist framework (Chomsky 1968: 25). Such a belief seems largely 
arbitrary, being based on a conviction about the reality of progress in explication in the 
natural sciences that is not necessarily universally supported; likewise for the hopes for 
physics and related fields being able to explain an increasingly broad spectrum of problems 
from a wide array of domains of human existence. Not mention the problem with the content 
of explanation, which is not as obvious at it seems to be. 
Let me a bit be more specific about Chomskyan methodology and provide one 
example. Chomsky’s texts lead its readers from insistence on the abstract description of 
language or brain to the requirement of doing the considerations on empirical grounds 





universals (a kind of abstract characteristics), on the other hand, she should be able to explore 
these innate features empirically. There is no obvious contradiction in the task described 
above, but there is a certain methodological tension. The argument that specific features have 
to be attributed to the mind in order to “make language possible” is nondemonstrative. 
(Piattelli 1979: 273). As a matter of fact we can provide some observations from empirical 
studies which will illustrate the hypotheses of universal grammar, but they will by no means 
prove them. Supposing that brain is structured in a certain way can be unproblematic claim as 
long as we do not try to translate it into some observational criteria taken from the natural 
science. And only the latter task, rightly so, seems to be of Chomsky’s interest. In order to 
make such a translation we have to face complex, multilayered, sophisticated machinery taken 
from given theory in the natural science, where we are not able to avoid the dependence on 
specific concepts, suitable methodology, and all which counts as the empirical. Taken this 
move into account, we have to agree that the initial unproblematic claim and all other theory-
related assumptions become a moot point. As it has been mentioned before, we can see that 
studying the history of science. 
 
Example Two: Communication 
 
 Chomsky’s assumptions on the status of human communication are a rich source of 
interpretational problems for his readers. Let us recall that the study of human communication 
against the background of animal communication is one of the tasks Chomsky sets for 
linguists. In his 1968 book, Language and Mind, Chomsky asserts that human language is 
entirely different from all other systems of animal communication, a belief that is echoed in 
some of his most recent works (Chomsky 1968: 4, Chomsky 2002: 63). The crucial difference 





feelings. To be precise, FLN is a uniquely human capacity, demonstrating a distinct profile 
thanks to which it stands out from all other communication systems (Chomsky, Hauser, Fitch 
2002: 1571). At the same time, Chomsky stresses that FLB is strictly compatible with animal 
communication; it is a human adaptation for language, constitutes a complex system for 
effective communication and has an inalienable genetic component. According to him, there 
exists evidence supporting the thesis of biological continuity between humans and animals 
with respect to speech; for example, evidence on animals possessing and being able to use 
abstract concepts (such as tool, color, geometric relation, digit), as well as on their having a 
theory of mind (the concept of self, the ability to represent beliefs). Chomsky does not 
expound in detail his understanding of communication, so it is not clear whether 
communication in humans is similar to that in animals or uniquely different, or whether 
communication (related to FLN and FLB, respectively) covers both those possibilities 
depending on the content of a particular concept. Moreover, Chomsky himself in his 
Architecture of Language declares that there are no criteria of comparison between different 
communication systems in animals. How, then, can one face the task of describing human 
communication in relation to other forms of animal communication, a theoretical maneuver 
that was aimed at illustrating the specificity of the former?  
 A philosopher is inclined to ask at this point about the general nature and criteria of 
establishing what is similar and what is different. Such questions are central from a 
methodological point of view, when one attempts to illustrate the validity of the theses about 
the similarities and differences between human and animal communication (Chomsky 1968: 
405). Let us recall that Chomsky argues for the view that despite every child having different 
experiences (in the contact with the external environment) and being confronted with different 
data, the system, or mechanism, of acquiring language is the same for all human children, as 





be an empirical fact that under normal circumstances those acquiring the first language do it 
in a strikingly similar manner. Still, why should this environment be a factor promoting 
divergence rather than convergence? One could risk a thesis that children grow in similar 
family environments, surrounded by their relatives who care for them in similar ways (they 
feed them, put to sleep, comfort, cuddle, etc.). This strikingly similar way of acquiring 
language would on that account have more to do with the similar type of stimulus accessible 
to the child. Once again, both the hypotheses formulated by Chomsky and those I quoted 
above need a more precise statement of the criteria of similarity; at least to the extent 
sufficient and possible within the given theory. 
 A possible reason why Chomsky shuns a precise explanation of what communication 
is may be his conviction that the communicative function is not the basic function of 
language. To him, language is comprised of numerous modules and functions, and none 
should be granted a privileged status. The function of language is not only to inform, but also 
to establish interpersonal relations, to express thoughts, to have fun, to understand, etc. Still, 
the above conviction does not exempt a researcher from the task of making the category of 
communication precise. What is more, an additional accusation, often quoted in the literature, 
seems to be applicable here, namely that about ignoring the social dimension of language use. 
As has been observed, to Chomsky, only I-language constitutes a proper object of linguistic 
scrutiny, while the shared, public language is merely an epiphenomenon, called into existence 
by philosophers. Let me note, however, that the functions that I have enumerated above 
following Chomsky seem to require taking into consideration the presence of other persons in 
the functioning of language. A considerable number of researchers stress the fact that when 
communication is understood as the exchange of information with individuals similar to the 
subject, psychologically it is a vital truth that language cannot be acquired one one’s own. In 





insufficient account of natural language. It is merely a simplistic idealization, since it is 
restricted to the study of the speaker in abstraction from the fact that it is surrounded by other 
individuals (Burge 1989: 174-177). 
 
Example Three: Language: an Abstract Entity or a Biological Token 
 
 To a philosopher, the problem of the ontological status of language is inevitable to 
emerge in the process of refining the details of any particular theory of language, and 
especially when the theory one deals with has a naturalistic profile. This is so, because under 
this approach, in one of the possible ways (since in contemporary philosophy we are faced 
with many different “naturalisms”), physicalistically understood existence becomes 
distinguished and is treated as an obvious starting point
5
. It is not easy to notice that from a 
philosophical point of view such a strategy is largely arbitrary and always requires an 
appropriate spelling out. Chomsky as a realist proposes that language be approached in a 
scientific way (as opposed to being an object of metaphysical speculation), which precludes 
understanding it as some sort of artifact or abstract object. By the same token, a linguist 
should be concerned with natural facts, not artifacts. Language is something real in the sense 
that, thanks to its specificity (see below), it constitutes a valid object of productive study. 
Thus, all controversies regarding the description of language should be decided on the level of 
discussion about facts, not on the level of highly speculative philosophical disputes that breed 
such entities as “public language”, “common language”, “national language”, etc. (Chomsky 
1968: 25). Chomsky maintains that language (qua I-language) has, by definition, no objective 
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 Arguably, a separate work could be devoted to tracking down the profusion of approaches that are termed 
“naturalistic”, or to identifying the theses they all accept. It seems that one has to agree with Putnam, who states 
that naturalism is an unclear and ill-defined notion, and that the successive attempts at introducing order to its 
application lead only to the discovery of still other differences between the so-called naturalistic theories rather 





existence except in the form of its representation in the mind. The mental, key to the way in 
which Chomsky understands language, is regarded as one of the several aspects of the world 
(alongside such aspects as the mechanical, the chemical, the optical, the organic, etc.), so it is 
not contrasted with the physical. This is the case also because no well-defined and consistent 
notions of “body”, “matter”, or “the physical” have been developed, which severely limits 
their theoretical usefulness. As a result, Chomsky denies that the mind/body problem has any 
sensible conceptual status. This problem is impossible to formulate in precise terms, as there 
exists no unambiguous understanding of what body is, nor what mind is, and so the relation 
between them cannot be studied. In this manner, Chomsky evades classical ontological 
questions, since he assumes that whatever exists, exists physically, and yet “the physical” can 
manifest itself in a variety of ways. It can be said that biological is one of them. 
Let us recall that in Chomsky’s theory the notion of public language is rejected as too 
abstract for it to be specified. At the same time, I-language mentioned above is treated, on the 
one hand, as an abstract object, but on the other, as a collection of biological facts. Hence as 
any given biological object, language can be studied in respect of: a) its function, b) its 
structure, c) the physical substrate on which it is based, d) its development, understood 
ontogenetically, e) its evolutionary development (Chomsky 1980: 227). Regarded in this way 
(points c, d, e), linguistic study becomes to a considerable extent a part of cognitive 
psychology (Chomsky 1965). The ability to use a natural language is considered to be an 
ability that can be at least partly explained by means of investigating the mental structures of 
linguistic representations (generated according to grammatical rules) whose character is 
internal. A perspective for such a study is set by the research on communication in animals 
(including humans) (Chomsky 2002: 63). Language must necessarily be biological in order 
for it to be a viable object of study outside the subjective mind of a particular individual. Still, 





symbolic format. An abstract status is a property of deep structure, whose features are to be 
discovered in the theory of language acquisition, where one should be able to explain how the 
knowledge of hidden language forms and their governing rules is acquired
6
. A natural 
language is a function characterizable with structural descriptions, and the particular 
grammars are instances of universal grammar whose parameters have been set to optimal 
values. Grammars, so understood, are real in the sense that they exist in the brains of 
individuals, while ethnic languages are not: not only is their structure unspecified, but also 
their ontological status is unknown (cf. the abstract character mentioned above). Their 
existence is purely secondary and epiphenomenal. How should abstractness be understood in 
this context? Chomsky does not provide an exact definition; what is known with certainty is 
that “the abstract” does not have a physical character. But if so, what is the ontological status 
of abstract objects if existence can only be physical (if in a number of different ways)? How 
can such a dualistic understanding of language as an object of study be made consistent in his 
theory, if at the same time one wants to remain unaffected by the accusations of philosophical 
speculation, introducing entities of a dubious status, etc.?  
 
Example Four: Innateness 
 
 Let us now turn to the most famous and most controversial of Chomsky’s 
(hypo)theses, that is those regarding language innateness and its universality. I have 
mentioned before that the human language capacity, considered from this perspective, is 
innate in the biological sense and remains invariant across cultures, being the same for all 
humans. In 1960, Chomsky suggested that the faculty of language is innate, substantiating this 
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claim with three observations regarding the functioning of natural language that were meant 
as specific support for his thesis. To simplify, they were as follows. Firstly, the syntax of a 
natural language is too complex for children to learn it from the forms they hear. Secondly, 
adults, when talking to children, supply them with fragmentary and often incorrect language 
data (in spite of which children master the full ability of correct communication in their native 
language). Thirdly, children learn language very fast (compared to the acquisition of other 
skills), which seems to attest to the fact that this ability relies on some underlying innate 
capacity (Clark 2003: 399). Innateness hypo(thesis) can be treated as a consequence of 
Chomsky’s rationalism and as an element of Chomsky’s methodology is visible in at least two 
aspects. The one concerns the cognitive endowment of humans as a biological species 
displaying linguistic ability, the other, closely related, regards the properties that are ascribed 
to language itself. Both aspects are considered by Chomsky from a biological perspective 
(Chomsky 2002: 1). Generally speaking, Chomsky believes that there exists human nature 
that remains unchanged regardless of what takes place in the environment of a given person. 
The only possible changes are the changes to the biological species itself. So considered, 
language – as an element of human cognitive endowment – is immutable; this also means that 
all particular languages are similar to one another on a deeper level, imperceptible at first 
glance.  
 Chomsky often simplifies and trivializes the problem of innateness. In one of his 
interviews, he puts forward the following statement. To claim that language is not innate is to 
claim that when one takes a stone, a rabbit and a grandmother, and places them in an English-
speaking community, they will all end up learning English (Chomsky 2000b). Nevertheless, 
such a take on this problem fails to show the explanatory power of the innateness (hypo)thesis 
– all the more so that in the above formulation it is not at all clear what is in fact innate. 





have different ways of building houses, but can one take it to demonstrate that constructing 
skyscrapers counts as innate? Chomsky quite often repeats that innateness is not problematic 
when understood as a principle, it becomes problematic when one wants to prove it using 
some empirical criteria (Piattelli 1979: 53). But that is something which we want to do in our 
considerations, to dress abstract claim in the empirical suit. It must be noted again that, as a 
matter of fact, in the innateness controversy the most important is the answer to the question 
of what is actually innate. This answer appears to constitute the crux of the matter, not so 
much polarizing the researchers into opposing camps, but generating a certain continuum of 
positions in regard to what may or may not qualify as innate. Chomsky himself agrees that 
there is no general innateness (hypo)thesis and he makes his best to show the specificity of the 
universal grammar. He also makes efforts at specifying his answer by introducing the 
categories of universal principles (e.g. distinctive phonological features, material universals, 
noun, past tense). The violation of those principles, even in the case of an artificially 
constructed system, would render it impossible to learn. Therefore, it is crucial to identify 
these principles, as well as to specify the methods with which they can be captured. What 
universal traits are dictated by the biological faculty of language, and does their presence in at 
least the majority of (if not all of) the world’s languages count as enough evidence for their 
innateness? Nevertheless, one could as well maintain that it is certain indispensable cognitive 
skills, and not language, that are innate – certain cognitive endowment that allows language to 
evolve (Tomasello, Bates 2001: 304-305). 
 More fundamental questions emerge at this point. Is the thesis about the innate 
character of language a proven thesis, or simply a hypothesis? Does it explain anything? Does 
it give us more information about language as such? Frequently enough the innateness thesis 
appears in the form of a hypothesis that serves to explain two problems: the problem of the 





grammar of its native language based on the utterances that it hears. This hypothesis can be 
reformulated in the following way: there is no reason not to suppose that children are born 
with exquisite knowledge of universal grammar that they make use of to acquire their native 
language (Chomsky 1968: 434). Accordingly, the innate schema is postulated as an empirical 
hypothesis that explains the homogeneity, specificity, richness in detail, and structural 
elaboration that characterize the grammars that are used by proficient speakers (Chomsky 
1968: 410). The homogeneity mentioned above proves, or at least suggests, the existence of 
such a schema. The hypotheses of similar sort are, however, very difficult to verify; although 
they are fully admissible as conjectures, their status is not in any way privileged over the 
hypotheses from competing theories of language. A large group of researchers strongly 
oppose the innateness hypothesis on a number of specific grounds
7
. Empirical research is 
quoted to question the validity of both the second and the third of Chomsky’s observations: 
adults provide children with speech that is characterized by a high level of grammatical 
correctness, and children need a relatively long time to master the use of syntactic structures 
(Clark 2003: 399). 
 From philosophical point of view one can state that innateness controversy beautifully 
points out metaphysical and even ethical assumptions taken both by the adherents of 
innateness and by its opponents. If one listen to the dispute between them, one can easily find 
out that there is no such view as pure radical empiricism or pure radical rationalism. There is 
a kind of spectrum of views where accents on what is acquired and what is innate have been 
put differently. 
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
                                                 
7
 The opponents of the innateness thesis include E. Bates, B. MacWhinney, M. Tomasello, D. Slobin, R. 





 In 2004, a second edition of Chomsky’s Language and Politics (Chomsky 1988) came 
out, substantially extended by the inclusion of a great number of interviews that had been 
made with Chomsky over the years of his intellectual activity. That the discussions 
concerning language, its origin, theories of its acquisition, and its philosophical and 
psychological contexts are placed alongside the interviews on the current socio-political 
issues – is not accidental. This is the case because to Chomsky, the political and philosophical 
questions are interconnected. On a number of occasions, Chomsky expressed a conviction that 
behind the claims of a non-innate character of language there are particular political views, 
related to specific interests. One example could be the belief in the possibilities of 
manipulating human minds: if one sees the human to be a tabula rasa, it is susceptible to any 
influences, or at least there exist good grounds for exerting such influence. 
 In particular philosophical conceptions there are numerous theoretical 
interdependencies that may not be readily visible at first glance. This applies to Chomsky’s 
theory as well. His own beliefs, too, are embedded in a broader and not always sufficiently 
explicated context of assumptions that are made in order to develop particular theses. It seems 
that the most essential of his theses is the one regarding the existence of human nature that 
can be characterized and explained using a biological vocabulary. Its formulation requires 
such categories as empirical confirmation, facts (as opposed to artifacts), and “the natural” (as 
opposed to entities that are socially constructed); these categories are presupposed to be 
transparent and unequivocal. In this text, I have undertaken to show that their acceptance 
stems from certain philosophical or, strictly speaking, metaphysical judgments. These include, 
notably, the most basic one, about the exclusively physical character of existence (whatever 
this could mean); and the only worthwhile study concerns itself only with the entities that 
exist in this way. If the only really existing language is the internal system of lexicon and 





existence harbors assumptions that do not always find support in what is “factual”, “natural”, 
or “empirically verified”. This reality is derived from rationalistic and realistic philosophical 
presuppositions. They allow Chomsky to state that there exists a biologically shaped 
rationality characteristic of immutable human nature; that experiences and external 
environment have negligible effect on the shape of the language faculty; that the study of 
shared public language is relatively unimportant for the description of this faculty; that the 
capacity for using language, implemented in the human brain, can be studied by means of the 
increasingly advanced methods of the natural sciences; and so on. Such statements are 
compiled not only on the basis of empirically confirmed theses, but also arguments that had 
been accepted prior to any confirmation process; these include the arguments which served to 
establish what forms an empirical proof or confirmation could take in this case. All of this 
should be borne in mind when setting out to evaluate the validity of particular judgments 
within the remarkable theory of Noam Chomsky. 
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